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They haven't. At first glance, P* may look like an especially good way to forecast inflation. But a closer look raises doubts about that. And those doubts are confirmed by some simple tests of its forecasting ability. Had P* been used to forecast inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, its track record would not have been much better than those of other forecasting methods. While P* may not be a bad way to forecast inflation, it is certainly not an exceptionally good way either.
What's So Appealing About P*?
This new inflation forecasting method is appealing to many people because it is fairly simple, it seems to make sense, and it is consistent with a widely respected theory of what causes inflation in the long run.
It's Simple... As an inflation forecasting method, P* can be described with just a few simple equations.
One equation states an obvious fact: at any time in an economy, the number of dollars spent or received equals the number of dollars changing hands. Since early in the century (Fisher 1911) , economists have expressed this fact as the equation of exchange:
(1)
PXQ = MXV
where P = the current price level (here, I'll use the implicit price deflator of gross national product, or GNP) Q = the current level of output, adjusted for inflation (here, real GNP)
M -the current money supply (here, the Fed's M2 definition of money) 2 V = the velocity of money (the number of times each dollar of the money supply is spent each year).
Those interested in using this equation to study inflation can rearrange its parts to solve for the current price level:
(2) P = MX V/Q.
Economists at the Federal Reserve Board have transformed this equation into a potentially useful forecast- ing tool by making two assumptions about two of its parts: V and Q. First, they assume that no matter where V and Q happen to be at any time, these variables always tend reasonably quickly (say, within two or three years) toward equilibrium (or long-run) values, which the Board economists call V* and Q*. Second, the economists assume that at any time these equilibrium values are easily computed from the available historical data. In particular, V* is just the annual average of V since World War II, which is around 1.65. (See Chart 1.) And Q* is the full capacity level of output-potential output-in the economy, which is assumed to be the smooth trend path of real GNP. The Board economists measure Q* as growing at a constant 2.5 percent annual rate since about 1981. 3 (See Chart 2.) The Board economists combine V* and 0* with the rearranged equation of exchange (2) to produce one more equation, this one for what they call P*: the price level that would occur with the current stock of money if V and Q were at their equilibrium values, (3) P* = MX V*/Q*.
The significance of this equation for forecasting inflation over the next few years can be seen by comparing it with equation (2) and making use of the Board economists' assumptions. Obviously, the only way P and P* can differ is by V differing from V* or Q differing from (2* or both. But, the assumptions say, if these variables ever differ, then over a few years, their equality will be restored as V and Q drift toward their long-run values of V* and Q*. What this means, of course, is that over a few years P will tend to drift toward P*. Therefore, if at any time P exceeds P*, then the rate of growth in P (inflation) can be expected to fall for the next few years as P moves down toward P*; and if Pis ever less than P*, inflation can be expected to rise. This temporarily lower or higher rate of inflation can be expected to continue until P= P*, at which time the inflation rate will settle NOW) accounts, automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts, and credit union share draft accounts], (2) savings and small-denomination (less than $ 100,000) time deposits, (3) money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), (4) shares in noninstitutional money market mutual funds, (5) overnight repurchase agreements (RPs), and (6) overnight Eurodollar deposits issued to U.S. residents by foreign branches of U.S. banks. For more details on the Fed's money stock definitions, see Walter 1989. down to its long-run average, the growth rate of P*.
Since the Board economists assume that V* is constant and that <2* will continue to grow at 2.5 percent, the growth of P* depends on the growth of Mt how much greater that is than the growth of Q*. In other words, the long-run inflation rate implied by the P* analysis equals the difference between the long-run growth rates of the money supply and potential output.
The P* inflation prediction is easy to illustrate graphically. Consider Chart 3. There, the P* curve assumes that the long-run annual growth rates of money and output are 7 and 2.5 percent, so that the annual growth rate of P*-that is, the long-run inflation rateis 4.5 percent. The curve traces the path P* takes over six years, assuming (for simplicity) it starts at 1. The chart depicts two imaginary situations with regard to the current price level, P. In one, P starts above P*, with a value of 1.2; in the other, P starts below P*, with a value of 0.8. Note how, from either side, P moves substantially closer to P* within three years and how this requires that for a time P grow less or more rapidly than P*. The relative speed of growth shows in the relative slopes of the curves. This is dramatized in Chart 4, which plots the year-over-year average growth rates of all variables in Chart 3. Note how P* grows 4.5 percent throughout and how inflation is temporarily higher than that when P starts low and temporarily lower when P starts high.
. . . And Plausible and
Well-Connected In addition to this simplicity, the P* analysis has at least two other characteristics that some people find appealing.
One is that its assumptions seem plausible. Recall that the P* analysis assumes that the long-run rate money changes hands (V*) and the rate potential output (£?*) grows are constant over the few years that P moves toward P*. Many people find those assumptions reasonable because a few years seems too short a time for significant changes to occur in long-run variables such as these which are dependent on slowly changing things like habits and technology.
The other appealing characteristic is P*'s consistency with the widely accepted quantity theory of money (particularly as defined by Lucas 1986) . Loosely, this theory says that over a period of many years, where M goes, only P follows. That is, in terms of long-run average growth rates, a one percentage point change in money growth shows up only as a one percentage point change in inflation, without changing output growth at all. 4 This idea can be seen in the P* analysis, too: its assumption that Q* grows smoothly is consistent with the idea that Q*'s growth is not affected by changes in M. Many people seem to think that consistency with the quantity theory adds credence to P*.
A Closer Look
It doesn't. In fact, neither of the last two reasons people seem to like P* holds up under scrutiny. And at least one of these failings has potentially serious implications for the usefulness of P* as a monetary policy tool. True, P* is consistent with the quantity theory. But that consistency is irrelevant to P*'s forecasting ability. For the consistency here is between ideas about inflation over the long run-a period of perhaps 10-20 years. As we have seen, P*'s forecasts are for inflation over a much shorter period, only 2-3 years. The quantity theory says nothing about that period. So the agreement between P* and the quantity theory says nothing about P*'s ability to predict inflation in the shorter run.
Also questionable is the plausibility of P*'s assumptions. Recall that these assumptions are, in short, that velocity will eventually return to its historical average (V*) and that the level of output will return to its historical trend (2*). If either of these assumptions is wrong, then the P* analysis could seriously mislead anyone using it to make policy decisions. And today there is ample evidence that both of these assumptions may be wrong.
Consider the assumption about velocity. Suppose for some reason the average value of V were to drop permanently, but the P* analysis were used with the historical average. Then P in (2) would drop below P* as Vfell and V* in (3) continued to be held fixed, and the P* analysis would falsely signal an imminent danger of inflation. Actually, this may have happened after late 1982 when financial innovations such as money market deposit accounts and Super-NOW accounts were introduced. Since then, M2 velocity has almost always been below V* (Chart 1). Those who think this reflects a permanent drop in velocity say it reflects the reduced opportunity cost of holding M2 due to the fact that these new types of accounts pay explicit interest.
Similarly, consider the assumption about the economy's underlying trend level of output. Suppose that its growth rate were to accelerate, but that this acceleration were not taken into account in the P* analysis.
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Then P would be driven below P*, and once again the analysis would falsely warn of inflation. The notion that the growth rate of potential or trend output should shift abruptly is actually pretty reasonable. Even the Board's historical record of Q* displays periodic, abrupt shifts in its growth rate. Before the first oil price shock, in the early 1970s, for example, Q*'s growth rate was around 3.4 percent. Just after the oil shock, its growth rate dropped to 2.8 percent, and with the second oil shock, in the late 1970s, it fell again, to 2.5 percent. (See footnote 3 for more details.)
In either of the above two situations, if the Fed were paying close attention to the P* analysis, it might be tempted into a needless and potentially harmful credit contraction.
How Well Does It Forecast?
Still, the fact that the P* method requires some assumptions that may be false does not necessarily mean it will not work well. All forecasting methods require assumptions that are false at some level. This does not necessarily imply that they will forecast poorly. The only reasonable basis for evaluating a forecasting method is how well it does what it's supposed to do: forecast. I test P* here, using two different approaches. And while P* doesn't do badly, it doesn't do especially well either.
Qualitatively, Not Clear
My first approach is qualitative. How well would P* have predicted the direction of the major changes in U.S. inflation since World War II? The answer, unfortunately, is not clear.
The postwar price experience is dominated by two events: the dramatic rise of inflation in the 1970s and its fall in the 1980s. I do a graphical analysis to investigate whether P* would have helped policymakers anticipate these events.
Chart 5 shows measures of inflation, the price level, and P* over the last 30 years. Look first at inflation's unprecedented rise to double digits in the late 1970s. Would the P* analysis have predicted that rise? Maybe, according to this chart. From 1963 until 1970, P* exceeded P} apparently successfully forecasting the accelerating pace in inflation. But twice P* stopped signaling the alarm: during 1970 and from the second half of 1974 until the second half of 1976. It did this even though the underlying inflation rate clearly had not yet fallen. Thus, the evidence on whether P* would have signaled the big rise is somewhat mixed, though on balance it seems to be reasonably positive. What about Lawrence J. Christiano p* the big fall? Here P* gives a sharper, less ambiguous signal. The actual price level, P, was consistently above P* from mid-1978 to mid-1985, clearly predicting lower inflation ahead.
What about since the big fall? Since 1985 until very recently, the P* analysis predicted a rise in inflation, though inflation has remained fairly stable at a low level. What this means is hard to say. It could have at least two interpretations. One is that P* was right. It was correctly signaling the threat of rising inflation, and the Fed's gradual credit-tightening moves since 1987 eliminated the threat. This idea is consistent with the facts that starting in 1987 there was some upward pressure on inflation and now P* coincides with the actual price level. The other interpretation of the recent data, of course, is that P* was wrong. This could be true, as noted before, if its assumptions are wrong. In particular, the fall of P below P* could just reflect some combination of a rise in the growth rate of potential output and a fall in velocity. Obviously, although a qualitative analysis like this is a good, simple way to start evaluating a new forecasting method, it is not good enough for most people who want to know how well that method can really forecast. As we have seen, a qualitative approach doesn't give clear answers about P*'s ability to predict even dramatic changes in inflation. Partly that is because it doesn't give quantitative forecasts of inflation, which is what most forecasters want anyway: how much will inflation change and when? A quantitative analysis should be less ambiguous, too, since it can weigh the pluses against the minuses. Also, the evaluation has so far not been comparative; where does P* rank relative to other methods of forecasting inflation? Those who call P* the holy grail of inflation forecasting seem to think it is far superior to all competitors. Is it?
Quantitatively, Not Clearly Better
To answer such questions, we need more than just the simple separate P and P* equations. A comparison of P fP* is constructed using equation (3).
Sources: Federal Reserve Board ot Governors; U.S. Department of Commerce;
Hallman, Porter, and Small 1989 and P* can suggest the direction in which inflation will be moving, but not how much it will move or when. To determine things like that, we must build P and P* into an explicit statement of what determines future inflation and how, that is, into a mathematical model. Economists at the Federal Reserve Board have done this by starting with a simple benchmark model that forecasts future inflation by just extrapolating, or projecting, past inflation. The Board economists incorporate P*/Pinto that model. According to the resulting model, if P*/Pis large (meaning P* is much greater than P), then the forecasted level of inflation is higher than would be indicated by extrapolating past inflation alone. This is the P* model I will test. To keep this test simple, I will start by comparing the performance of the P* model to that of just one other forecasting method. Experience in the Research Department of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank suggests that the quarterly change in the yield of 90-day Treasury bills (T-bills) is helpful in forecasting inflation. So, to construct an alternative model, I inserted this change into the Board's benchmark model. In the resulting model, when the yield on 90-day T-bills increases, the inflation forecast is higher than what a simple extrapolation of past inflation rates would indicate. Now I have two competing models: a P* model and a T-bill model. (For technical descriptions of these, see Appendix A.) How shall I compare them? The natural way to do that is to find out what would have happened if two forecasters had started out long ago-one with each model-and had used the models to periodically forecast inflation, using at the time of each forecast only the information real forecasters would have had.
Thus, I started by giving each forecasting model all the available quarterly historical data it needs up to and including the fourth quarter of 1969.1 used these data to estimate the historical relationships between each model's variables. (In each model, the first period used for this estimation is the third quarter of 1960. 6 ) Then I had each model compute a series of one-year-ahead average inflation forecasts, each forecast using one more quarter of actual data. For example, I began with a forecast of the average inflation rate from the fourth quarter of 1969 to the fourth quarter of 1970 (which I dated 1970:4). Then I added the actual data for the first quarter of 1970 to both models' historical data, used the updated data to reestimate the variables' relationships, and computed a forecast of average inflation from the first quarter of 1970 to the first quarter of 1971. I proceeded in this way until I had a series of one-yearahead forecasts from the fourth quarter of 1970 through the third quarter of 1989. To evaluate the models' longer-run performance, I also computed sets of two-and three-year-ahead forecasts in the same way. (For technical details of my procedures, see Appendix B.) 7 The results of this test are shown in Charts 6-9. First consider Chart 6. Plotted there are the oneyear-ahead inflation forecasts of the P* and T-bill models and the corresponding actual inflation rates. Both the forecast and actual inflation rates are measured at an annual rate and in percentage terms. Perhaps the most noticeable thing on this chart is the way the forecasts seem to shadow, or lag, the actual inflation changes: instead of showing what inflation will be, these models seem to show what it has been. In that sense, neither model seems much of a forecasting tool.
Overall in Chart 6, the two models perform about equally well. Note that the chart has, roughly, four episodes. In the first, which extends until the late 1970s, the two models' forecasts nearly coincide. In the second, around the turn of the decade, the T-bill model forecasts better than the P* model. But the reverse is true in the third episode: In the early 1980s, the P* model does better. In the final episode, during recent years, the two models' forecasts are close together again, though not as close as they were at first. Considering all four episodes, we must conclude that neither of these models is superior to the other.
These observations are much clearer when we chart just the models' forecast errors. In Chart 6, the forecast error for any model is the vertical distance between the actual inflation rate and the model's forecast. Mathematically, an error equals the actual minus the forecasted inflation rates, so positive numbers represent underpredictions; negative numbers, overpredictions.
Chart 7 plots the forecast errors that correspond to the one-year-ahead forecasts in Chart 6. The episodic pattern we saw there is easier to see here: first the two models do about equally well, then the T-bill model 6 My data set starts in the first quarter of 1959 because that is the first quarter for which M2 data are available. The estimation period starts in the third quarter of 1960 because the forecasting equation requires six initial observations on the price level: four reflecting the number of lags in the model and two more reflecting second-differencing of the price data.
7 Each forecast of the P* model requires a forecast of P* itself. According to equation (3), the forecast of P* requires forecasts of M, V*, and Q*. Appendix B explains how forecasts of these variables were computed using only data that would have been available at the time of each forecast.
Note that my calculations actually only approximate how well real forecasters would have been able to do with these models during the forecasting period. This is because I use revised data here, while real forecasters would have had to use preliminary data. 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 Chart 7 Inflation Forecast Errors (Actual -Predicted) % Pts. 6r
Chart 9 Three Years Ahead 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 fAII the forecasts begin in 1969:4, but the curves in Charts 8 and 9 start later than the others because these curves are for longer forecast periods (two and three years, not just one). Throughout, each forecast is plotted on the last quarter of its period. does better, then the P* model does better, and finally the two come together again.
This same pattern appears in the two-and threeyear-ahead forecast errors, which are plotted in Charts 8 and 9. Overall in these charts, the two models perform similarly, but there are subperiods in which one dominates the other.
In sum, neither the P* nor the T-bill model is clearly much better than the other at forecasting inflation from one to three years out.
8 A comparison of P* and seven other models (in Appendix C) produces the same result. If P* is, indeed, the inflation forecaster's holy grail, then there is little hint of it in the historical data. Board's measure of P* for the calculations reported in the paper. In the table, the coefficients of the P* model seem relatively insensitive to which measure of P* is used. This is consistent with the results reported in Appendix B, according to which forecasts from the P* model do not deteriorate when my measure of P* is used instead of the Board's.
Appendix B Calculating the Forecasts
Here I describe the calculations underlying Charts 6-9 in the preceding paper. Throughout, forecasts only use data available at the date of the forecast. The results of the following experiment suggest that the P* model is not placed at a disadvantage by using my measure of (2* rather than the Board's. I constructed a Board measure of P* for the period 1959:1-1989:3 using actual M2 and the Board's reported measure of Q* (Hallman, Porter, and Small 1989). I constructed my version of P* for the same period using actual M2 and my measure of Q*, computed using estimates of /3q and obtained from real GNP data covering the period 1959:1-1989:3. In both versions of P*, the measure of V* used was the sample average of V over that fThese models correspond to equations (B1) and (B2).
period. I then computed out-of-sample one-, two-, and threeyear-ahead inflation forecast errors as I describe in the paper, except here I assumed that the whole time series on P* is known. My results are as shown in Here I further analyze the results in Charts 6-9 in the preceding paper, while also describing the results of other tests not detailed there. Besides the two models tested in the paper, I also examined the real-time forecasting performance of seven other models. The results of all the tests are the same: P* is not far superior to other simple methods of forecasting inflation.
More Models and 3 Statistics
Among the seven extra models are two money growth models and one term structure model. In the money growth models, I replaced Rt~\ -Rt-2 in the T-bill model ( Besides these three models, I also considered four more. One is the benchmark model mentioned in the paper; it simply extrapolates inflation from its own past because it sets a = 0 in the P* model. Another I call combination; it combines the P* and T-bill models in the obvious way, by adding 8 as an explanatory variable to the P* model, where <5 is an unknown parameter to be estimated. I also used what I call a level T-bill model; it is the same as the T-bill model, except that it replaces log(/,* \/ Pt-\) in the P* model with Rt-1 instead of Rt-\ -Rt-2 and it obtains forecasts of Rt using an AR(3) instead of an AR(2) model. The final model I call premium; it uses Rct-\ ~ Rt-1 instead of log(P,!i /Pt-\) in the P* model, where Rct is the yield on commercial paper. In the premium model, forecasts of Rct -Rt come from an AR(2) model.
For each of the above seven models, I computed one-, two-, and three-year-ahead forecast errors using the same real-time procedure applied to the P* and T-bill models (as described in Appendix B). Then I used the forecast errors of all the models to compute three statistics by which to evaluate and compare their inflation forecasting performance. One of these statistics, the simple average of the forecast errors (or the mean), is designed to assess whether a model's forecasts are biased. The two others measure the typical absolute size of a model's forecast errors: the mean of the absolute values of the errors (the MAVE) and the square root of the mean squared error (the RMSE). The basic difference between these two is that the RMSE weighs large forecast errors relatively more heavily than the MAVE does. All three statistics are measured in percentage terms at an annual rate.
The Results
The results for each model at each forecast horizon are displayed in Table C1 .
Eyeballing the 3 Statistics
Consider first the results for the P* and T-bill models, shown in the table's first two rows. They are based on the forecast errors in the paper's Charts 7-9, and they confirm the paper's conclusions: though on some dimensions one model seems to outperform the other, overall the two models perform about equally well. In terms of bias and average absolute error, the T-bill model outperforms the P* model at all three forecast horizons, but in terms of the RMSE, the P* model outperforms the T-bill model at all horizons. In either case, these differences seem too small to be economically or statistically significant. For example, in RMSE terms, the largest improvement from using the P* model rather than the T-bill model occurs at the three-year horizon. That improvement is a mere 0.15 of a percentage point, an economically negligible amount in view of the roughly 6 percent inflation we have averaged over the postwar period. Also, a glance back at Charts 7-9 shows that the magnitude of fluctuations in the forecast errors is much larger than 0.15 of a percentage point. This suggests that differences in RMSE of such magnitude are not statistically significant, or that the superior RMSE performance of the P* model can't be counted on to persist. The formal statistical analysis reported in the next subsection supports this conclusion.
Bringing the results of the combination and benchmark models into the analysis offers additional ways to assess how much information about inflation is contained in P*. Thus, comparing the combination and T-bill model results shows that there is little information in P* that is not already in T-bill yield changes. Incorporating P* into the T-bill model (to get the combination model) reduces the bias and magnitude of the T-bill model's forecast errors by a trivial amount. Comparing the benchmark and P* model results suggests a sense in which P* actually contains disinformation about inflation. According to the mean and MAVE, introducing P* into the benchmark model (to get the P* model) reduces forecast accuracy at all horizons. What evidence there is that P* improves inflation forecasts appears to be greater when the P* model is compared with the remaining five models. This improvement in forecast performance seems most pronounced with the RMSEs. For example, at the three-year horizon, the level T-bill model's RMSE is 0.73 of a percentage point higher than the P* model's. But even RMSE differences of this magnitude are not statistically significant.
Formally Analyzing 1 Statistic
To determine that, I computed /-statistics for testing the null hypothesis that the true RMSE of the P* model is identical to that of each of the other eight models. For any model and forecast horizon, this /-statistic is just the ratio of the difference between the model's RMSE and P*'s RMSE to the standard error of that difference. In Appendix D, I argue that these /-statistics have, approximately, a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis that the true underlying RMSE differences are in fact zero.
The /-statistics are displayed in Table C2 . For convenience, the RMSE differences-the numerators in the /-statistic ratios-are also displayed there. (Apart from discrepancies due to rounding, the RMSE differences can be obtained by subtracting the appropriate elements in Table CI .) The fact that all but one of the differences are positive reflects the fact that all but one of the P* model's RMSEs are lower than those of the other models.
Despite that, the /-statistics in Table C2 are all consistent with the hypothesis that each model's true RMSE performance is actually identical to that of the P* model. All of the /-statistics are very close to zero, the central tendency of the standard normal distribution. For example, the /-statistic for the T-bill model's one-year-ahead forecasts is only 0.30. The probability that a standard normal random variable will exceed 0.30, in absolute value, is 76 percent. Even the largest /-statistics, those in the last four rows of the table, are quite small. For example, the probability of a standard normal random variable exceeding (in absolute value) 1.3, the largest /-statistic in the table, is 19 percent, t
The Conclusion
Thus, my analysis has failed to turn up any convincing fSome readers of early drafts of this paper were concerned that the simplicity of the AR(2) representation I used to forecast money for the P* model may have placed that model at an unfair disadvantage. They suggested evidence that P* far outperforms other models as an inflation forecaster. In my tests, P* does worse than its competitors on some dimensions and better on others. The dimension on which P* looks best is the estimated RMSE of its forecast errors. But the superiority of P* on this dimension is so small that it could just reflect dumb luck.
Appendix D Rationalizing the Use of the Standard Normal Distribution an alternative procedure which avoids the need to forecast other variables when forecasting inflation: use annual or biennial rather than quarterly observations to forecast inflation one or two years out. Note that, effectively, this procedure throws away a large number of observations. Other things the same, one expects that to result in a deterioration in forecast performance. Still, to investigate this suggestion, I used annual data to compute a set of real-time, one-year-ahead forecast errors using annual versions of my P*, T-bill, combination, and benchmark models. I found that the forecast performance of all these models is generally inferior to that of their quarterly counterparts. Moreover, the annual P* model forecasts less well than all of my quarterly models: the quarterly T-bill and benchmark models beat it in terms of all three of my statistics, and the other quarterly models beat it in terms of two of the three, the mean and the MAVE.
Here I explain why the r-statistics in Appendix C's Table C2 can be interpreted as though they were drawn from the standard normal distribution.
An Approximation
Let 7 denote the estimator underlying the numbers in any of the differences columns in that table. Thus, 7 is the estimated RMSE for the forecasts of one of the models in the table minus the corresponding RMSE for the forecasts of the P* model. Let 7 denote the underlying true RMSE difference. This is what 7 would be if it were computed using an unlimited number of observations instead of the 70-odd data points that are actually available. I use Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments formula to estimate the standard error of 7. To a first approximation, the ratio of 7 to this standard error (the r-statistic discussed in Appendix C) has an asymptotic standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis that 7 is zero.
To use Hansen's standard error formula, I must express 7 as the solution to the sample analog of some first-moment condition. To keep the notation simple, I describe here just the calculations for the T-bill model's one-year-ahead forecast errors. The calculations for all the other models and forecast horizons are analogous.
To start, define this 2 X 1 random variable:
(Dl) ht(y,o) = {7(7 + 2a] -e(AR,t) 2 + e(P*,0 2 , o 2 -e(P*,t) 2 }' where a is the RMSE for the P* model's forecasts and e(AR,t) and e(P*,t) are the date t one-year-ahead forecast errors from the T-bill and P* models. Also, 7 = or -a, where or is the RMSE for the T-bill model's forecasts, so that 717 + 2o] = o\ -o 2 . Therefore, if a is the (unknown) true value of a, then Eht(7, a) = 0 for each t. This is the first-moment condition that underlies my estimator of 7 (and a).
The sample analog of this condition is Both S and S are 2 X 2 matrices, and S is assumed to be positive definite under the regularity conditions. My estimator of S, 5, replaces the population second moments on the right side of (D6) by their sample counterparts and truncates the summation for \k\ >6. In addition, I linearly damp higherorder covariances according to the formula of Doan (1988, p. 14-143) with 6 = 1.
A Hitch?
An attractive feature of Hansen's estimator of the variancecovariance of (7,5) is that it is robust to autocorrelation and conditional heteroscedasticity in h t (7,a) . However, as Christopher Sims has pointed out to me, Hansen's stationarity requirement may not be satisfied. After all, model parameter estimates are based on less data at the beginning of a sample period than at the end. Therefore, forecast errors may have larger variance at the beginning than at the end. Charts 7-9 in the paper give (slight) support for this possibility. Thus, it may be worthwhile to investigate whether failure of Hansen's stationarity assumption substantially affects my standard error estimates. Still, I suspect that it does not, for my results are very strong. To overturn my conclusion about the comparable RMSE performance of the P* and T-bill models, for example, would require showing that my /-statistics are biased downward by a factor of at least five. This is because the largest of those /-statistics is 0.4 and rejecting a null hypothesis at the conventional 5 percent significance level requires a /-statistic roughly equal to 2.
